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This comparative study of the corporate governance systems in Singapore and Hong Kong shows the 
importance of a sound financial sector with monitoring capabilities for workable governance. In spite 
of their differences, both the Government-Linked Corporation-based system in Singapore and the 
gradually reforming Family-based System in Hong Kong have worked relatively well. Neither system 
seems to be evolving towards an equity market-based system, but increased technical competence and 
better governance of banks and financial firms will enhance their monitoring capabilities. Thus 
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Abstract 
 
  The relative immunity of Singapore's corporations, including family-owned and controlled 
corporations, from the recent financial crisis can be attributed to reasonably well-functioning financial 
markets, government oversight and cooperation and coordination among the major domestic players in 
an open and competitive market structure. The reforms with respect to auditing and accounting - and to 
some extent board of directors - will undoubtedly strengthen the governance structure; but it does not 
seem that Singapore will be transformed into a purely equity market based governance structure in the 
near future. However, a more consolidated banking structure with strong government backing can be 
expected to become more involved in monitoring the corporations. Over time, some institutional and 
other large domestic and foreign investors can also be expected to play an enhanced role in monitoring 
the corporations in Singapore. 
 
  Hong Kong has a predominance of family-based system (FBS) of corporate governance. The 
main difference between FBS as a governance system and others such as bank-led (BLS) or equity 
market-based (EMS) system of corporate governance is that ultimate control of the firm resides with 
the family groups rather than banks or the equity markets. As the share of external finances rises with 
the growth of the firm, agency costs increase due to problems of asymmetric information between 
management and external financiers. FBS can be a workable form of governance under such conditions 
only with proper monitoring capabilities of the financial system, managerial expertise and market 
competition. Particularly important for reforming the FBS is the need for recruiting and training 
competent professionals so that the financial institutions can gather and analyze the relevant 
information about the firms they finance. Furthermore, there must be formal and informal means to 
influence the decisions of a borrowing firm when it appears to be not performing well.  
 
Several factors explain Hong Kong’s success in continuing with gradual corporate governance 
reforms. First and foremost, is the relative strength of the financial sectors. Both the banks and the 
equity markets have proved to be much stronger than those in other regional economies during and 
after the crisis. Second, the presence of both competition and cooperation in the financial sector has 
made it possible to regulate effectively through the Banking Ordinances and Listing Rules and 
Takeover Codes. A third factor is that in Hong Kong the insolvency and bankruptcy procedures are 
relatively straightforward. This makes exit of insolvent firms economically less costly and after such 
exits the system regains its vigor. Fourthly, increasing the emphasis on accounting and auditing 
standards improvements will make monitoring, including some further self-monitoring by the family 
businesses themselves easier. Finally, although this may not be the most significant, the smallness of 
Hong Kong also makes it easier for informal agreements to be made and kept through reputational and 
other relational mechanisms. 
  In economies where some of the above characteristics that make reforming FBS in Hong 
Kong possible are present, some degree of reform of FBS may be possible, so that this system remains 
effective as an interim type of governance for some time to come. However, the role of banks even in 
this interim period must be strengthened a great deal more than it is today. Without a strong,   3 
independent banking system the agency costs arising from the monitoring problems in most Asian 
economies will still remain high. In order to improve corporate governance in Asia, the monitoring 
capabilities of the financial sector - in particular the banking system - must be given top priority.    4 
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1.  Introduction  
 
The purpose of this paper is to identify some of the factors related to corporate 
governance in Asia that may explain why the firms in some Asian economies were 
able to survive the recent crisis better than others. Two important Asian economies 
where firms were able to survive relatively unscathed are Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Apart from macroeconomic and monetary factors, were there firm or industry- 
specific reasons for this outcome? In particular, are there features regarding their 
corporate governance systems that can help explain the resilience of firms in these 
two Asian NIEs during the crisis? If so, then can the other Asian economies in crisis 
draw some lessons from the experience of Singapore or Hong Kong that will be 
helpful in reforming their own systems of corporate governance? 
  During the Asian financial crisis many analysts pointed to weak corporate 
governance as the major factor behind the financial and economic collapse of the 
affected Asian economies.
1 With the benefit of hindsight, retrospectively many 
weaknesses of the corporate governance systems have indeed been pointed out. 
However, two types of analytical difficulties have generally accompanied these 
attempts to characterize the problem of corporate governance. 
  The first and most immediate difficulty is the problem of explaining why in 
spite of such weak corporate governance the Asian crisis economies were able to 
grow rapidly for so long. The second difficulty, related to the first, is the casual 
empiricist approach to finding faults with Asian corporate governance.
2 According to 
this line of criticism, since the crisis so obviously exposed its weaknesses, the 
corporate governance system in these economies must have been corrupt and 
inefficient. As such it must also be unworkable in the future and must be replaced by 
a better type (the usual recommendation is the Anglo-American model) of corporate 
governance.  
However, further reflection would show that this is simply restating the 
observed phenomena (i.e., that corporations in the crisis-affected economies were/are 
                                                            
1 See World Bank (1998), East Asia: The Road to Recovery and Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang 
(1998, 1999a,b), Claessens, Djankov and Lang (1998, 1999) and Pomerleano (1998). There was also a 
debate as to whether the crisis was a conventional or a new type of crisis. Yoshitomi and Ohno (1999) 
argue persuasively for characterizing the crisis as a new, capital account type of crisis that requires new 
type of remedies rather than the old IMF-medicine. 
2 Imporatnt exceptions are the papers by Stijn Claessens at the World Bank and his co-authors. 
However, the results derived so far are not conclusive, and rely on a cross-section of Asian economies.   6 
in trouble), and can at best be a circular argument, and not a genuine explanation. 
Genuine efforts to explain the weakness of corporate governance have usually 
focused on the deviation of the corporate governance systems from the arms length, 
equity market-based Anglo-American model of corporate governance. Implicit in this 
exercise is the assumption that the Anglo-American model is an ideal that is of 
universal applicability and deviations from this model are therefore indicators of 
failure of corporate governance to various degrees. However, this claim of universal 
applicability of the Anglo-American model is not accepted universally. At the same 
time, it must be admitted that the alternative forms of corporate governance in pre-
crisis Asia have not been conceptualized adequately. Therefore, one cannot accuse the 
advocates of the Anglo-American model of ignoring a compelling alternative 
theoretical account of Asian corporate governance systems. Clearly, then, a 
conceptual, theoretical account of Asian corporate governance system(s) is called for. 
Khan (1999) is an attempt to offer an alternative conceptualization of the most 
dominant type of Asian corporate governance. This is called the family-based 
corporate governance system (FBS) and can be contrasted with both the Anglo-
American equity market-based (EMS) and the Japanese main bank or German 
universal bank-led system (BLS). According to this analysis, in order to explain what 
went right during the period of high growth and what went wrong with corporate 
governance that resulted in the crisis, the strengths and weaknesses of FBS must be 
understood clearly. Not only does this approach unravel the above puzzle of 
explaining both rapid growth and subsequent crisis, it also raises some new questions. 
For example, the initial rationale for FBS appears to be that at a low level of 
development, when institutional and legal foundations are weak and markets 
underdeveloped FBS with its high degree of family control, economizes on 
transaction costs.
3 But as per capita income continues to grow and markets and 
institutions develop, the importance of the initial rationale should gradually diminish. 
What then can explain the persistence of the FBS type of governance for some Asian 
economies with high per capita income such as Hong Kong? Furthermore, why does 
the FBS still seem to work in Hong Kong as opposed to South Korea where it seems 
to be obviously in trouble?  
                                                            
3 This partly explains the successful performance of FBS during the Asian Miracle when specific 
government policies encouraged rapid industrialization.   7 
  In order to answer these questions, this paper begins by briefly recapitulating 
the most important features of the family-based corporate governance system. Next, 
the case of Singapore is examined. It turns out that in spite of the presence of some 
large and concentrated family holdings Singapore’s corporate governance is largely 
determined by the mode of operation of the government-linked companies. This 
makes Singapore somewhat of a special case. The situation in Hong Kong, however, 
is closer to the typical family group dominated corporate sector found in most Asian 
countries. In the next section an examination of the reforms of corporate governance 
system in Hong Kong shows the effectiveness of gradually reforming the family-
based system during the 1990s. However, our most significant finding is the salience 
of the strength of the financial sectors - in particular the role and location of banks and 
security markets - in making corporate governance reforms effective. Whether or not 
corporate governance reforms can lead to improved monitoring and performance 
depends crucially on strengthening the financial sectors, including the improvement 
of corporate governance in these sectors. 
 
 
2.  Basic Issues in Corporate Governance: Family-based and other systems of 
Corporate Governance in Asia
4 
 
  As mentioned before, recent studies have all emphasized the predominance of 
family ownership and control of Asian corporations.
5 How are these firms governed? 
Table 2.1 describes the key aspects of the family-based system of corporate 
governance. The FBS can be contrasted with the bank-led system (BLS) and equity 
market-based system, as shown in table 2.2. 
  In this context, the key issue in governance is the problem of monitoring the 
family businesses. We can distinguish between two phases of growth of the family 
business here. In phase one the family businesses are financed internally. Since the 
owners are also the managers in most cases and there is no outside financier, there is 
no agency problem and self-monitoring is effective. However, later the family 
businesses usually borrow from banks and raise capital by issuing stocks. At the same 
time, even with large doses of external finance, under the prevailing FBS type of 
                                                            
4 This part draws heavily from Khan (1999), section II and III, which can be read for greater detail.   8 
governance the family groups still control the governance aspects (including the 
decision to hire and fire management and in many cases the selection of members of 
board of directors). Clearly, under such circumstances there is an asymmetry of 
information between the outside financiers and the inside owner-managers. This will 
usually lead to both an adverse selection and a moral hazard problem.
6 With the 
emergence of these problems, agency costs will rise as the share of outside financing 
rises under the FBS type of governance. 
  Under these circumstances the FBS type of governance, unless improved 
through appropriate reforms, will lead to inefficiencies in production and 
mismanagement of assets. There could be managerial slack, inappropriate 
diversification of businesses and other types of unproductive managerial behavior 
leading to inefficient performance. If the governance structure were of the BLS type, 
the banks themselves would take the initiative to rectify the situation by various 
means, including the replacement of existing management. Alternatively, under the 
EMS type of governance, the hostile takeover market is supposed to ensure better 
governance. Under both the BLS and EMS, in the extreme case, insolvent firms will 
be liquidated. However, when the governance structure is of the FBS type and the 
firm is not performing well, there does not seem to be an obvious mechanism for 
improving its performance. This is the reason why understanding the relative 
immunity of some economies (e.g. Hong Kong) with large family businesses from the 
problems of FBS at the later stage is so important to study. It should be mentioned 
that FBS is not the only type of corporate governance in Asia. Singapore displays an 
altenative form of relatively successful governance system discussed in the next 
section. In this context both the similarities and differences between Singapore and 
Hong Kong are revealing, as the following sections will show. In particular, 
Singapore displays a different system of corporate governance. It is governance 
through the Government-Linked Corporations (GLC). In spite of this obvious 
difference, the success of both the (reformed) FBS system in Hong Kong and the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
5 Some earlier studies of specific countries have also emphasized this fact. See for example Koike 
(1993), Khan (1999), Sato (1993), Suehiro (1993; 1997) and Taniura (1989; 1993) 
6 The adverse selection problem arises from the selection of relatively more risky borrowers in the 
financial markets unless external financiers carefully perform ex-ante monitoring of potential 
borrowers. The moral hazard problem also arises from the asymmetry of information between the 
lenders and borrowers. If the lender does not have precise inside information about the investment 
projects undertaken by the borrower there is a chance that funds will be misused by the borrower. The 
misuse of borrowed funds can occur through the selection of more risky projects unless external 
financiers perform interim monitoring function.   9 
GLC-based system in Singapore can be attributed to some common features discussed 
below.   10
Table 2.1: Description of Family-Based System of Corporate Governance 
 
Type of Corporate Governance System   
Family-Based System (FBS) 
 
Share of control-oriented finance 
High initially, but may vary as family 





Small, less liquid 
 














Weak for outsiders 
 
Creditor rights 
Strong for close creditors 
Weak for arm's length creditors 
 
Dominant agency conflict 
 
Controlling vs minority investors 
 












Monitoring of non-financial enterprises 
(NFE) 
Information asymmetry and agency costs 
rise with the growth of firms, making 




Initially, self-monitoring is effective 
because of non-separation of owner and 
management. Later stages present 
monitoring problems as agency costs rise 
due to separation of owner-managers and 
outside financiers. 
 
Source: Haider A. Khan (1999), Corporate Governance of Family Businesses in Asia: What's Right and What's 
Wrong?, ADBI Working Paper no.3  11
Table 2.2: Comparing Equity Market-Based and Bank-Led System of Corporate 
Governance 
 
Type of Corporate Governance System   
Equity Market-Based 
System (EMS) 
Bank-Led System (BLS) 
 









Large, highly liquid 
 
Not necessarily small but less 
liquid than EMS 
 





Not necessarily small 
 





















Strong for close creditors but 




Dominant agency conflict 
 
Shareholders vs management 
Banks vs. management 
Workers may be important 
stakeholders as in Aoki’s 
model of the Japanese firm 
 




Limited, but less so than in the 
case of FBS 
 










Potentially important; but 




*Note: Berglöf uses the term insolvency but the problem of exit of insolvent firms is directly related to bankruptcy 
laws and procedures. 
 
Source: Berglöf (1997), “Reforming Corporate Governance”, Economic Policy 24 
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3.  The Singapore Story: Corporate Governance through Government-linked 
Corporations 
 
  Although Singapore has some large family-owned or controlled conglomerates 
such as Sembawang and Keppel, the government-linked corporations or GLCs are the 
dominant type of firms. By the late 1980s, GLCs accounted for sixty nine percent of 
total assets and seventy five percent of profits of all domestically controlled firms in 
Singapore (Phan and Teen 1998). These shares were reduced somewhat in the 1990s 
through privatizations, but the government holding companies such as Temasek 
Holdings, MND Holdings, Singapore Technologies etc. control most of these GLCs 
even now (see table 3.1). Singh and Siah (1998) have suggested that cooperation 
between firms - in particular, the GLCs - is an important feature of industrial 
organization in Singapore. This scenario of cooperation applies to large family-





Table 3.1: Government-Linked Companies in Singapore 
 
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL 
 
Trading 
1. Intraco  Limited 
(Temasek 45.71%, MND 13.6%) 
 
Manufacturing 
1.  Hwa Tat Lee Holdings Limited 
(Temasek 5.19%, MND 5.19%) 
2.  Singapore Petroleum Company Limited 
(Temasek 8.22%, MND 25.79%) 
 
Investment Holding/Trading 
1.  Transpac Industrial Holdings Limited 
(Temasek 8.22%, MND 6.72%) 
 
Engineering 
1. Jurong  Engineering  Limited 
(Temasek 22.82%) 




Shipping & Marine 
1.  Far East Levingston Shipbuilding Limited 
(Temasek 56.99%) 
2.  Jurong Shipyard Limited 
(Sembawang Corporation 20.00%) 
3.  Keppel Corporation Limited 
(Temasek 31.18%) 
4.  Neptune Orient Lines Limited 
(Temasek 33.35%) 
5. Sembawang  Corporation  Limited 
(Temasek 38.16%) 
6. Sembawang  Maritime  Limited 
(Sembawang Corporation 35.63%) 
7.  ST Shipbuilding & Engineering Limited 
(Singapore Technologies 54.98%, Temasek 
60.52%) 




                                                            
7 La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) report that three largest shareholders own an 
average of 49% of the 10 largest non-financial firms in Singapore. This is certainly high compared to 
U.S. and U.K. The close coordination is also very different from the Anglo-Saxon practice. Thus 
Singapore's practice in corporate governance has a strong element of state intervention.   13
Information Technology 
1.  Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation 
Limited 
(Singapore Technologies Pte Limited 70.61%) 
2.  Singapore Telecom Limited 
(Temasek 88.66%) 
3.  ST Computer Systems & Services Limited 
(Singapore Tech Industrial Corp 60.75%) 
4.  Steamers Maritime Holdings Limited 
(Temasek 54.13%) 
 
Construction & Building Materials Supplies 
1. Natsteel  Limited 
((Temasek 15.30%, MND 14.50%) 
2.  Resources Development Corporation Limited 





1.  Comfort Group Limited 
(Singapore Labour Foundation 37.89%) 




1. CWT  Distribution  Limited 
(Temasek 35.28%, MND 20.26%) 
2. Vicom  Limited 
(Singapore Labour Foundation 75.00%) 
 
Printing & Publishing 
1.  Singapore Press Holdings Limited 
(Temasek 5.45%) 
2.  SNP Corporation Limited 
(Temasek 49.00%) 






1.  Development Bank of Singapore Limited 
(MND 22.01%, Temasek 19.95%) 
2.  Keppel Bank of Singapore Limited 
(Temasek 74.28%) 
3.  Overseas Union Bank Limited 
(Temasek 1.32%) 
4.  Tat Lee Bank Limited 
(Temasek 18.75%, MND 13.90%) 
 
Insurance 
1.  Insurance Corporation of Singapore Limited 
(Temasek 49.60%, MND 49.60%) 
 
Other Financial Services 




1.  DBS Land Limited 
(Temasek 31.77%, MND 31.24%) 
 
 








2.  National Kap Limited 
(Temasek 19.32%) 
 
Source: Financial Database and Centre for Business Research & Development, Faculty of Business Administration, National 




  In Singapore, the special role and importance of the governance of financial 
services sector is particularly important. The government's industrial policy targeted 
the financial services sector along with information technology as the two most 
important areas for further economic development of Singapore.
8 The rules of 
governance (including disclosure rules) are set by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS) and Stock Exchange of Singapore (if the financial services firm is   14
listed). The MAS, in particular, sets stringent standards for regulating the financial 
services sector. Thus the governance structure of the financial firms is in general 
consistent with the goals of restraining risky lending and speculative deals. The 
Banking Act, Insurance Act and Finance Companies Act contain sections describing 
disclosure standards and board responsibilities. It can be argued that the expectation 
on part of the authorities, in particular MAS, that appropriate guidelines will be 
followed by the financial services sector is on the whole correct. Therefore both the 




  The Singapore story with respect to corporate governance is unusual also in 
the sense that given the openness of the economy and relatively little restriction on 
share ownership one would be led to expect a prominently Anglo-American type of 
equity market-based corporate governance. According to the standard economic 
theory under such circumstances the open capital markets should allocate funds 
competitively. Such competition for funds should lead to a selection mechanism for a 
governance structure that would reward managers for maximizing shareholder wealth. 
Furthermore, the competitive capital market should also lead to a market for takeover 
and acquisition of corporate assets. In practice, none of these features are much in 
evidence in Singapore. This creates a puzzle for the standard theory if one wishes to 
apply it to Singapore's corporate governance practices. 
  However, if we take the institutional approach that uses the idea of costly 
transactions and (institutionally) bounded rationality (Williamson, 1985) then the 
inapplicability of the standard model to Singapore no longer remains a mystery. 
Given the presence of GLCs, friendly takeovers and government-guided coordination, 
transaction costs are lowered by the current type of corporate governance. In the 
standard theory, transactions are supposed to be costless, but as Williamson has 
underlined, in the real world there are (transaction) costs of planning, organizing, 
adapting and monitoring. Given the open and competitive environment in Singapore, 
if GLC type of governance did not have significantly lower transaction costs than 
alternative types of governance, the firms could never survive in open competition 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8 Distribution was a third area also picked out for special emphasis. 
9 In terms of capital adequacy ratio the 12 percent requirement set by MAS is not only met but is 
exceeded in many cases. The average CAR, according to the author's interviews with the authorities 
and researchers at JP Morgan and Daiwa Research Institute in Singapore - is close to 17 percent.   15
with foreign firms that have different governance structures. Within the country, the 
costs of coordination both within-firm and between-firms are lowered by Singapore’s 
special type of corporate governance. This, of course, may not hold indefinitely in the 
future as local and global market conditions change. Of course, the discipline of the 
capital market can increasingly be an important factor. However, more important for 
good governance will be the adoption of more rigorous accounting standards, 
stringent disclosure rules and competent audit committees. Openness also contributes 
to good managerial practices by prompting the management to respond quickly to 
foreign competition, a trend that is likely to continue in the future even more 
prominently because of the increasing emphasis on competition policy. 
  Although Singapore inherited the Common Law tradition from the British at 
the time of its independence it has been quite flexible in accommodating foreign 
investors from countries such as Japan and Germany with very different legal 
traditions. Commercial codes are also more flexible than in the Anglo-American 
setting. For example, the Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers is non-statutory 
and merely expands on the sections 213 and 214, and the statutory provisions found in 
10
th schedule of the Companies Act.
10 However, in the past, the government has 
shown its willingness to introduce more stringent regulations in other contexts. For 
example, after the collapse of Pan Electric Industries in 1970s and Amcol Holdings in 
1996 the Stock Exchange of Singapore was prompted to adopt more exacting 
reporting rules. After the 1996 incident a requirement (which was later withdrawn) for 
audit committees to be set up with a majority of independent directors was instituted 
for some time. 
  In sum, the relative immunity of Singapore's corporations, including family-
owned and controlled corporations, from the recent financial crisis can be attributed to 
reasonably well-functioning financial markets, government oversight and cooperation 
and coordination among the major domestic players in an open and competitive 
market structure. The reforms with respect to auditing and accounting - and to some 
extent board of directors - will undoubtedly strengthen the governance structure; but it 
does not seem that Singapore will be transformed into a purely equity market-based 
governance structure any time soon. However, in the future a more consolidated 
banking structure with strong government backing can be expected to become more 
involved in monitoring the corporations. Over time, some institutional and other large   16
domestic and foreign investors can also be expected to play an enhanced role in 
monitoring the corporations in Singapore. 
  Because of its unique history as a city-state under strong centralized leadership, 
Singapore’s corporate governance system is to a large extent an exceptional case. 
However, this historically path-dependent development of governance through GLCs 
still shows the significance of strong financial sectors, including banking. The 
importance of competent and relatively transparent accounting and auditing 
procedures is also underlined. In the next section we look at Hong Kong where the 
above characteristics of a relatively well-functioning corporate governance system are 
demonstrated for the more typical (in the Asian context) FBS type of governance 
structure. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
10 See Phan and Teen (1998) for more descriptive details.   17
4.  The Family-Based System in Hong Kong 
 
Hong Kong SAR probably illustrates the reform of FBS type of governance in 
Asian economies the best. In spite of gradual reforms, the predominance of family-
control even in large corporations leaves no room for doubt that the governance 
structure is still heavily dominated by families. In a survey by the Hong Kong Society 
of Accountants (1997) it was found that fifty three percent of all listed companies 
have one shareholder or one family group of shareholders owning fifty percent or 
more of the entire issued capital. Seventy seven percent of all listed companies show 
one shareholder or one family group of shareholders owning thirty five percent or 
more of the entire issued capital. Finally, if one looks at the 25% or more level, the 
extent of control by one shareholder or one group of family shareholders rises to 88 
percent. Although the board of directors does not always have a majority of family-
connected directors, the influence of large shareholders from families is still 
considerable. Figure 4.1 shows the control structure of one of the largest family-based 
conglomerates - the Li Ka-shing family holdings. 
   18




















Source: Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov and Larry Lang (1999), “Who Controls East Asian Corporations?”, The 




  The above observations are also corroborated by the information available on 
the background of executive directors. In about 84% of the cases studied by HKSA 
where families hold 35% or more of the company's issued capital, more than half of 
the executive directors are related as family members. Thus, the available evidence 
shows that controlling shareholders do tend to invite family members to govern the 
corporation as executive directors. 
  The data from the survey conducted by HKSA are tabulated in tables 4.1 
through 4.4. It is surprising how small the percentage of companies with audit 
committees is (only 2%). There were only 12 companies among the 553 listed 
companies with audit committees' disclosure in the annual report. Even the number of 










































































percent of the total. Out of a total of 553 companies the majority (67% or 373 
companies) did not disclose this information in the annual report. 
 
Table 4.1: Audit Committee Disclosures 
Disclosure of company with an audit committee 





Companies with an audit committee 





   553 100 
Source: Hong Kong Society of Accountants (1997), “Second Report of the Corporate Governance Working Group” 
 
Hong Kong Listed Companies - Family Presence 
Table 4.2: Shareholding Control  
Companies  Shareholding (by single or family shareholder) 
Number % 
0 - <10% 
10 - <25% 
25 - <35% 












   553 100 
Source: Hong Kong Society of Accountants (1997), “Second Report of the Corporate Governance Working Group” 
 
Table 4.3: Board of Directors 
Family presence of board of directors 
50% or more  Less than 50% 
 
Shareholding (by single or family shareholder) 
Number % Number % 
0 - <10% 
10 - <25% 
25 - <35% 






















   52 100  501  100 
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Table 4.4: Executive Directors 
Family presence of executive directors 
50% or more  Less than 50% 
 
Shareholding (by single or family shareholder) 
Number % Number % 
0 - <10% 
10 - <25% 
25 - <35% 






















   165 100 388 100 
Source: Hong Kong Society of Accountants (1997), “Second Report of the Corporate Governance Working Group” 
 
 
  Given the features of the corporate governance system in Hong Kong the 
relatively strong performance of various corporations in Hong Kong - with the 
exception of Peregrine - in both financial and non-financial sectors poses a riddle. If 
the FBS type of governance is responsible for the collapse of the chaebols in South 
Korea as some have argued, then the even more deeply-entrenched FBS type of 
governance in Hong Kong should have led to an equal if not a bigger catastrophe. In 
reality, Hong Kong survived the crisis relatively unscathed. Are the appearances 
deceptive or are there some special reasons why the flawed FBS type of governance 
still works in Hong Kong? 
  The answer is, in short, that in spite of some problems of FBS type of 
governance, gradual reforms, competition in the relevant markets, and relatively 
greater managerial and financial expertise within the firms may have saved Hong 
Kong from a fate similar to that of South Korea. In particular, the capacity to monitor 
both financial and non-financial firms has been significantly better in Hong Kong than 
in Korea or Thailand, for example. It was also fortunate that the HKMA had the 
financial resources to defeat the speculators when the Hong Kong dollar came under 
attack in October 1997. Finally, the strength of the financial sectors, in particular the 
relative strength of the banking sector played a very significant role as well. 
  Fundamentally, like Singapore, Hong Kong also has a strict monetary 
authority and reasonably strong financial system. While exceptions such as Peregrine 
can be pointed out, the fact that during the period of highest contagion the banking 
system did not collapse and systemic financial crisis was avoided, supports the 
general claim.   21
  In addition to good macroeconomic management with a relatively strong 
banking sector Hong Kong has one of the deepest equities markets in the region. 
Although this fact has not given rise to an EMS type of governance yet, the discipline 
imposed by both HKSE and the market for shares probably prevented the financial 
instruments from being misused by the family businesses by too wide a margin.  
  In assessing the performance of Hong Kong corporate groups relative to those 
in South Korea, two additional features of the corporations and markets in Hong Kong 
have to be emphasized. First, although the majority of the listed corporations are 
family-controlled, Hong Kong is ahead of Korea in professionalizing its management 
cadre. This is particularly true of the banking and financial sector. In addition to the 
presence of a large number of professional expatriates, the professionalization of the 
managers in Hong Kong is evidenced by the high quality of professional associations 
in management, accounting and auditing, finance and related fields. Although many 
problems remain, the Hong Kong corporate governance group has been actively 
engaged in improving the functioning of the FBS type of governance from within by 
stressing professional competence. As the group stated in December 1995 on the 
methodology of appropriate reforms in Hong Kong in relation to the Cadbury Report: 
 
“The Cadbury Report provided an in-depth study of financial aspects 
of corporate governance. While agreeing with most of the Cadbury 
Report's recommendations as steps in the right direction for good 
corporate governance measures, the Working Group is also wary of 
practical difficulties in applying some of the principles, particularly in 
the corporate environment in Hong Kong, at least in the short term. 
The Working Group, however, does not see a need to re-invent the 
wheel in considering corporate government requirements for Hong 
Kong. Instead, it has directed its attention to addressing the relevance 
of the recommendations of the Cadbury Report to Hong Kong, and 
identifying areas which can be and should be adopted immediately, in 
the medium term, and in the long term.” (Hong Kong Society of 
Accountants (1995), “Report of the Working Group on Corporate 
Governance”, p.3) 
 
  Thus, a realistic pace of governance reform per se, combined with 
professionalization within the firm may indeed be the right strategy for Hong Kong. 
Clearly, without competent professionals within the firm no amount of governance 
reform will enable the firm to perform better. The best that can be expected from   22
corporate governance under such circumstances is a speedy exit of the incompetent 
firms.
11 
  This consideration of exits also raises the issue of entry by new firms. The 
entry and exit problems are best discussed in a framework of market competition. 
This is the second area of difference between Hong Kong and some other regional 
economies that needs emphasis. How to generate appropriate type of competition so 
that markets are contestable is a priority area for competition policy in Hong Kong. 
Again, like Singapore the openness and presence of foreign rivals create an 
environment of both price and quality competition. Existing evidence (expressed in 
terms of Herfindahl index) shows that scope for competition varies from sector to 
sector. Table 4.5 and 4.6 illustrate this by presenting the Herfindahl indexes for two 
sectors in the financial services area. 
 
 
Table 4.5: Herfindahl Indices of Hong Kong’s Deposit-Taking Market by Licensed Banks 
 
  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992 
Number of Licensed Banks 
Demand Deposit - Hong Kong dollars 
Demand Deposit - Foreign currency 
Savings Deposit - Hong Kong dollars 
Savings Deposit - Foreign currency 
Time Deposit - Hong Kong dollars 
Time Deposit - Foreign currency 
Total Deposit - Hong Kong dollars 
     (market share by LBs, %) 
Total Deposit - Foreign currency 

























































Source: Cheng and Wu (eds) (1998), Competition Policy and the Regulation of Business, p. 24 
 
 
                                                            
11 Even for this to be true, there must be adequate capacity to monitor these firms. This in turn requires 
the technical capability to gather and analyze relevant information regarding the distressed firms. 
Furthermore, there must be mechanisms for liquidating the insolvent firms even in the face of enhanced 
management as opposed to such moves.   23
Table 4.6: Market Structure of Hong Kong’s Insurance Industry 
 







(companies that offer both life and general insurance) 
20 35.2    0.203 
General Insurers 
(including composite insurers) 











(including composite insurers) 











(including composite insurers) 
223 100  0.041 
 
Note*: Composite insurers’ market share is made up of 24.8% for life insurance and 10.4% for general insurance. In other words, 
the market share of pure life insurers is 29.3%, and the market share of the pure general insurers is 35.5% 
 
Source: Cheng and Wu (eds) (1998), Competition Policy and the Regulation of Business, p. 52 
 
  Before comparing the two tables it may be useful to offer an interpretation of 
the Herfindahl index which is technically the sum of the square of each firm’s market 
share. In the calculations presented above the shares of all firms in a certain sector are 
required to sum up to unity. Thus, if there are 10 firms in the market and their market 
shares are equal, then the Herfindahl index is equal to 1/10. Therefore, the inverse of 
the estimated Herfindahl index is often interpreted as the market’s “equivalent 
number of firms that are of equal shares”. 
  For example, in table 4.5 in 1992 the index for Demand Deposit - Hong Kong 
Dollars is given as 0.10. This information can be interpreted as indicating that this 
market segment in banking is as concentrated as one that is shared equally by 10 firms. 
  Using this type of interpretation it is clear that in table 4.5 the Hong Kong 
dollars deposit market is more concentrated than the foreign currency deposit market. 
Comparing the Herfindahl indexes given in table 4.5 with those for the insurance 
companies it can be seen that while the market for all issuers is less concentrated than 
that of life insurers, the composite insurance market is much more concentrated than 
either one of these with a Herfindahl index of 0.203. 
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5.  Reforming the FBS type of Corporate Governance in Hong Kong 
 
It should be emphasized that competition by itself is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for successful corporate performance. The modern corporation is 
a complex organization that is much more than a simple production function. Since 
there are transaction costs within the firm, a good governance structure appropriate to 
the type of firm and its particular relation to the economy as a whole is essential. This 
is why the FBS type of governance can be a serious candidate for reform, even when 
the per capita income in the economy is high with corresponding low transaction costs 
for dealings outside of the firm. 
  From the conceptual structure presented at the outset, as long as such reforms 
will  lower transaction costs in some relevant dimensions (for example, inside the 
firm), and at least not increase the agency costs further, efficiency of the firm should 
increase. Alternatively, lowering the agency costs without increasing the transaction 
costs will also enhance efficiency.
12 It is also clear that in theory, there are three 
logical possibilities. First, is the reform of FBS which we discuss here in the context 
of Hong Kong. The other two possibilities are a transition from the FBS to either a 
BLS or EMS type of structure. While this paper will present a strong case for 
reforming the FBS type of governance in Hong Kong, it will also point out the 
strongly supportive roles played by both the banking system and the equity markets in 
Hong Kong.
13 
  It is clear from the evidence presented in the previous section with regards to 
family ownership and control in Hong Kong that the high incidence of companies 
controlled by family groups raises concerns about whether the management would 
really carry out the present value maximization imperative. Of course, it could be 
argued that management by a controlling family may provide a long-term perspective 
that can counterbalance the focus on short-term performance by the stock markets. 
Nevertheless, as pointed out in section two, problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard exist once there is a separation between outside financiers and inside owner-
                                                            
12 Formally, if TB = transactions costs before reform and TA = transactions costs after reform, AB = 
Agency costs before reform and AR = Agency costs after reform, then corporate governance reforms 
will improve efficiency if and only if TR +AR < TB + AB. Furthermore, if there is a cost to reform, 
internalized by each firm as CR then the above condition can be rewritten as TR +AR + CR< TB + AB  
13 In the course of the actual evolution of an economy, FBS could be replaced by either BLS or EMS, 
but whether or how this will happen can not be deduced from theory alone, For this, a study of the 
historical evolution indicating the available paths at any point in time is necessary.   25
managers. Is Hong Kong trying to deal with these problems in a way so that long-term 
growth prospects of the firms can also be assured? The answer to this question is that 
the reforms are gradual, but gradually legal and regulatory infrastructures are being 
created in order to ensure that firms will perform well in the face of outside 
competition. Most importantly, the capabilities of the financial sectors to monitor the 
firms they finance is being improved continuously. Clearly, this also involves 
improving the corporate governance structure of the financial institutions themselves.  
  In discussing corporate governance reforms, it must be kept in mind that 
although Hong Kong’s legal infrastructure in relation to corporate governance is 
similar to that of other common law countries, the regulations tend to emphasize more 
heavily such matters as related party transactions arising directly from the 
convergence of majority owners and the management. Consequently, the threat of 
civil liability on the part of directors is less of a factor in driving corporate governance 
than in the Anglo-American context. 
  It is also relevant to note that most listed companies in Hong Kong are listed 
offshore. This clearly has the effect of constraining the power of domestic legislation 
in regulating the ‘internal affairs’ of corporations including their governance. What 
then takes the place of regulatory statutes if these do not always apply? The answer is 
that, in practice, non-statutory rules such as the Listing Rules and the Takeovers Code 
have much more effect on corporate governance. It appears that the attitudes of SFC, 
the SEHK and the market can influence the management more than the general legal 
environment which is common law-oriented. It is also significant that SEHK and the 
SFC emphasize education rather than disciplinary action in order to ensure 
compliance of the companies with principles of corporate governance.
14 In order to 
enable the SEHK and the SFC to perform this task well, close cooperation from the 
companies is also expected. There are certainly important ordinances and guidelines. 
These include the Companies Ordinance, Securities and Futures Commission 
Ordinance, Hong Kong Codes on Takeovers and Mergers, and the Rules Governing 
the Listing of Securities on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd.. According to the 
Memorandum of Understanding between the SFC and SEHK in 1991, the SEHK is 
recognized as the frontline regulator with regards to listing-related matters. This 
                                                            
14 Based on interviews with the representatives of various professional associations, academics and 
regulators in Hong Kong during July 11-16, 1999. I am grateful to Mr. Toshio Karigane and his 
associates at Daiwa Research Institute for facilitating some of these interviews and sharing their own 
perspectives on corporate governance in Hong Kong with me.   26
Memorandum of Understanding also gives SEHK the responsibility to supervise and 
regulate the listed companies, directors and shareholders. The SFC is brought in when 
exceptional circumstances require the exercise of powers of investigation. Thus, the 
Listing Rules in Hong Kong can be thought of as the most important source of 
authority for regulating the conduct of directors and the family groups controlling the 
listed companies. 
  Since 1991 Hong Kong’s corporate governance reforms have included the 
following: 
(1) A clearer understanding of the directors’ duties, especially their fiduciary 
responsibilities. 
(2) The requirement for the board of directors of a listed company to have at least two 
independent non-executive directors. 
(3) A Code of Best Practice was introduced in 1993.  
(4) Since December 31, 1995 all listed companies have been required to include in 
their reports a statement affirming compliance with this Code. 
(5) In May 1998, two additional guidelines were added to the Code of Best Practice. 
The first emphasized that the directors should keep abreast of their responsibilities. 
The second advised the listed companies regarding the establishment of audit 
committees. It was suggested that the audit committee’s scope should be extended 
in order to include a report on company’s wider obligations to community and 
business ethics. 
(6) The Listing Agreement in effect now also outlines clearly the responsibilities of 
companies for information disclosure. These responsibilities include the 
requirements for disclosing the public details of a wide variety of transactions 
including connected transactions which must be approved in a general 
shareholders’ meeting. Interested parties must refrain from voting at these 
meetings. 
(7) The SEHK itself is supervised  and monitored by the SFC. Under the existing 
institutional setting, the SFC can play a variety of roles from providing advice to 
directly suspending trading under Rule 9 of the Securities Rules. The SFC can 
also start an investigation or recommend to the Financial Secretary that an 
inspector be appointed.   27
(8) Furthermore, the SFC has been given powers to handle and monitor all matters 
connected to merger and takeover transactions of listed companies. In effect, this 
makes the SFC responsible for seeing that the takeover codes are applied properly. 
 
The above is a very quick summary of some of the most significant formal aspects of 
corporate governance. However, many other countries in Asia are adopting the same 
type of formal reforms. What makes the gradual set of reforms in Hong Kong 
effective? In order to understand the underlying structure of the operation of corporate 
governance in Hong Kong we need to focus on the financial markets - in particular 
the banking sector and the equity market. Accordingly the rest of this paper will deal 
with these two types of financial markets. 
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6.  Banking Sector and Corporate Governance in Hong Kong 
 
  In Hong Kong, the debt-equity ratio of corporations is much lower than in 
South Korea or Thailand. The debt-equity ratios for Hang Seng index companies in 
1997 was only 36 percent. While this may give the banks less of a direct role to play 
in corporate governance, there is still an indirect role to be played by the banks. 
Specifically, strong, professionally managed banks can reduce adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems by lending to borrowers who are willing and able to provide 
reliable and accurate information and show the capability for managing risk well. 
Such a technical, analytical approach on the part of the banks can reveal both the 
internal technical and managerial capabilities of the borrowing firm and the 
effectiveness of the borrowing firm’s corporate governance system.
15  
  Under the existing Banking Ordinance the aggregate holdings in shares by a 
locally incorporated bank is restricted to 25 percent of its capital base. Thus banks do 
not own a significant segment of the corporate sector. There is also no “main bank” 
system through which corporate control is exercised. Nevertheless, by maintaining a 
high standard of corporate governance in the banking sector itself and by lending 
prudently to firms about which they are informed relatively well, the banks indeed 
help create an environment where adverse selection and moral hazard problems are 
reduced. In Hong Kong, banks (in business groups) are also required to deal with their 
sister companies in the same group on an arms-length basis. 
  However, the Asian financial crisis also affected the asset quality of the banks 
in Hong Kong negatively. For example, in case of the local banks the percentage of 
total loans that were overdue and needed rescheduling increased from 1.8 percent at 
the end of 1997 to 3.81 percent by the end of September 1998 (Shiu, 1999). Although 
these figures are low compared to other Asian countries, the non-performing loans are 
expected to increase somewhat. Banks are therefore cautious in their lending. While 
this may retard the growth potential in some sectors - particularly real estate - the 
                                                            
15 These are important components that determine the performance of the firm. These are also 
important ingredients of what Khan (1999) has called The Governance Parity Hypothesis. This 
hypothesis attributes equal importance to both corporate governance and to factors that are related to 
the internal technological and managerial capabilities of the firm as well as market competition. 
Specifying the parity hypothesis as a null hypothesis and testing this against various alternatives 
statistically could throw more light on the relative importance of corporate governance in determining 
corporate performance in Asia. Of course, the formulation of the hypothesis should emphasize the role 
of governance - in particular, monitoring capabilities of the banks and other financial institutions - in 
determining the performance of the corporations.   29
banking system as a whole has been strengthened in the process. The banks remain 
highly capitalized and liquid with an average capital adequacy ratio of 18 percent. 
During the entire crisis period only one major listed financial company - Peregrine 
Investment Holdings - was liquidated. Although the incident received wide media 
coverage, Peregrine nevertheless represented less than 0.25 percent of the total market 
capitalization of SEHK. 
  From the discussion so far, it is reasonable to draw the conclusion that in 
Hong Kong, overall, the location of the banks in the financial structure can be said to 
have strengthened corporate performance. Recently,
16 the Hong Kong Association of 
Banks (HKAB) has also issued a guideline for dealing with corporate customers in 
financial distress. This is intended to address the corporate governance issues more 
directly than before. The underlying principles are as follows: 
(1) When it becomes public knowledge that a debtor company may be experiencing 
financial problems and the borrower has approached its banks, banks’ initial 
attitude should be one of support. They should not withdraw facilities or hastily 
put the company into receivership, or issue Supreme Court writs demanding 
payment. 
(2) Further decisions should only be made where these are based on information that 
is reliable and shared fully with all creditor banks (after obtaining debtor’s 
permission). 
(3) The decision to offer the distressed company financial assistance - or not - should 
be a collective one by creditor banks. 
(4) The objectives of any orderly workout-procedure should be to obtain for creditor 




                                                            
16 April, 1998   30
7.  Equities Market and Corporate Governance in Hong Kong 
 
  Appendix table A.1.1 summarizes the extent and reach of the capitalization of 
SEHK over the last six years. The total new equity raised from 1994 to 1997 
amounted to US $55.7 billion - much greater than capital raised by any other Asian 
market during the same period. Despite the slowdown during the last quarter of 1997 
a total of US $31.7 billion of new equity capital was raised on SEHK in 1997. Table 
7.1 below gives the total market capitalization on 31 December, 1998 for the last five 
years. 
 
Table 7.1: Market Capitalization (in HK$ billion) 
 
  1994  1995  1996  1997    1998 
































Source: Shiu, Barbara (1999), “Corporate Governance in Asia: A Comparative Perspective” 
 
In spite of the relatively large and liquid equity market in Hong Kong the 
minority shareholders do not appear to play a very significant role in corporate 
governance.
17 The role of pension funds and the government as holders of securities is 
also quite limited. However, in 10 to 15 years the Mandatory Provident Funds (MPF) 
may grow to be the dominant institutional investor and the situation of MPF and other 
pension funds with respect to corporate governance may change. At present, only the 
institutional fund management companies that are members of the Hong Kong 
Investment Funds Association play a role from time to time in corporate governance 
matters. 
  Given that the takeover market is not as active (especially hostile takeovers) as 
in the Anglo-American context, corporate restructuring involves a negotiated process 
so that the interests of the various parties can gradually converge. This does not mean 
                                                            
17 On those and related corporate governance issues in Hong Kong see Hong Kong Institute of 
Directors (1998), and Company Secretary (1999), HKSA (1995, 1997), HKSA’s Corporate 
Governance Committee (1997, 1998), Miller (1998, 1999)   31
that the insolvent companies stay in business, however. The bankruptcy and 
liquidation procedure is fairly well defined. In 1998, there was a total of 723 new 
compulsory liquidations - an increase of 44 percent over 1997. Of course, one could 
raise the question whether some insolvent companies were really just illiquid during 
the crisis period in Asia. However, the above figure represents only about 0.15 
percent of all companies. Compared to Thailand or Indonesia, the exit procedures in 
Hong Kong appear to be much more orderly. 
 
  The upshot of the above discussion is that well-performing Hong Kong 
companies have ready access to equity markets; but their corporate governance 
structures do not conform to the Anglo-American EMS type of governance. It may be 
closer to truth to characterize the corporate governance system in Hong Kong as a 
reformed FBS type that is evolving from one with complete family control to one 
where markets and regulatory environment can work together to provide incentives 
for improved monitoring of the firms. It is likely that in the long run when 
institutional investors are more active in corporate governance and hostile takeovers 
are more common, the governance system will approximate more closely the EMS 
type. However, the gradual reforms of FBS type of governance seem to have worked 
relatively well so far without bringing it very close to either the EMS or the BLS type 
of governance. 
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8. Conclusions 
 
  In this paper I have attempted to compare and contrast the dominant forms of 
corporate governance in two Asian economies that survived the recent crisis in Asia 
with much less damage than the others. Both Singapore and Hong Kong felt the initial 
jitters of the crisis and were affected by the contagion in the currency markets. 
However, Hong Kong managed to beat off the speculators and, with the exception of 
the spectacular failure of the Peregrine Investment Holdings the banking and financial 
system remained intact. In the same way, Singapore also was able to maintain 
integrity of its financial markets. Are there special features of these economies 
including their corporate governance systems that can help explain why they were less 
vulnerable than some other countries? 
  It appears from our analysis that indeed Singapore and Hong Kong both share 
certain characteristics that make their respective corporate governance systems still 
viable. To begin with, these are both economies with a healthy degree of openness 
and market competition. Secondly, the banking and financial structures are strong 
compared to those in other crisis economies. Of the two, Hong Kong clearly has both 
a better developed equity market and a better managed banking system. Singapore has 
been trying to remedy its lack of expertise in banking and finance by inviting foreign 
participants which is one way of making competition work while learning from 
foreigners. 
  However, when it comes to corporate governance per se the two economies 
clearly have divergent systems of governance. Hong Kong appears to have an FBS 
type of governance that is being reformed gradually. Singapore, on the other hand, 
relies on the GLCs to effect coordination among the major banks and firms. There is 
strong reliance on government authorities for monitoring. 
  It could be argued that Singapore’s success with the GLCs comes from its 
small economy which can be monitored by an effective government. At the same time, 
competition clearly plays a major role as well. It also appears that corporate 
governance in the future will have to rely on more extensive monitoring by financial 
organizations. Here the key question is whether Singapore will evolve towards a BLS 
or an EMS type of corporate governance. Although reforms with respect to allowing 
hostile takeovers with further development of capital markets are mentioned by 
academics, it is unlikely that the present practice of the government coordinating   33
businesses carefully will disappear quickly. It is more likely that further bank 
consolidation and strengthening of the banking sector together with the presence of 
foreign banks may allow the GLC type of governance to evolve so that it more closely 
resembles a BLS type of governance. However, given that the government controls a 
large volume of shares and seems willing to continue the practice of both having 
control of the GLCs and allowing competition in the market place, in the normal 
course of events there will be a significant role for the GLCs to play in Singapore for 
some time, even as the system evolves towards a BLS type of governance. 
  What is really of great importance for reforming corporate governance in Asia 
is the experience of Hong Kong with its gradual reform of the FBS type of 
governance. Let us recall that the key problem with the FBS type of governance is 
that at a later phase of the growth of family businesses when there is external 
financing of family businesses without external control, there can be severe problems 
of adverse selection and moral hazard arising from the asymmetry of information 
between the financiers and owner-managers. In economies such as South Korea this 
seems to have been disastrous. Hong Kong’s success in continuing with gradual 
reforms seems to stem from several factors. First and foremost, is the relative strength 
of the financial sectors. Both the banks and the equity markets have proved to be 
much stronger than those in other regional economies during and after the crisis. 
Particularly important for reforming the FBS is the need for recruiting and training 
competent professionals so that the financial institutions can gather and analyze the 
relevant information about the firms they finance. Managers of the financial firms 
should have the technical capacity to monitor the firms they finance. Furthermore, 
there must be formal and informal means to influence the decisions of a borrowing 
firm when it appears to be not performing well. The continuing reform of the FBS 
type of governance in Hong Kong emphasizes all of these aspects. Second, the 
presence of both competition and cooperation in the financial sector has made it 
possible to regulate effectively through the Banking Ordinances and Listing Rules and 
Takeover Codes. A combination of fairly transparent rules and laws together with a 
knack for working out problems through mutual consultation seems to provide a way 
to combine strengths of formal institutions, rules and procedures with those of 
informal relationships and procedures. To the extent that the same kind of 
environment can be created in other economies the FBS system may prove amenable 
to reform after all. However, a third factor is clearly relevant here also. In Hong Kong   34
the insolvency and bankruptcy procedures are relatively straightforward. This makes 
exit of insolvent firms economically less costly and after such exits the system regains 
its vigor. In attempts to reform the FBS elsewhere in Asia, creating legal and 
institutional structures that facilitate the exit of inefficient firms should, therefore, be 
emphasized. Fourthly, increasing the emphasis on accounting and auditing standards 
improvements will make monitoring, including some further self-monitoring by the 
family businesses themselves easier. Finally, although this may not be the most 
significant, the smallness of Hong Kong also makes it easier for informal agreements 
to be made. Such agreements can also be enforced relatively easily through 
reputational and other relational mechanisms. 
  Given the special features of Hong Kong it would be unwise to generalize the 
possibility of reforming the FBS everywhere in exactly the same way. Nevertheless, 
in economies where some of the above characteristics that make reforming FBS in 
Hong Kong possible are present, some degree of reform of FBS, so that this system 
remains effective as an interim type of governance for some time to come, may not be 
an unreasonable proposition. However, for many Asian economies, for example South 
Korea in particular, the role of banks even in this interim period must be strengthened 
a great deal more than it is today. Without a strong, independent banking system the 
agency costs arising from the monitoring problems in most Asian economies will still 
remain high. Thus in order to improve corporate governance in Asia, the 
strengthening of the financial sector - in particular the banking system - must be given 
top priority. In these regards, improving the capabilities of banks for collecting and 
analyzing the technical, economic and financial information necessary for monitoring 




Table A.1.1: Market Value of Equities on the SEHK (1993-1998 in HK$ million) 
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1 including warrants exercised, consideration issue and share option scheme 
2 provisional figure up to the end of December 1998 
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